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The Committee for Economic Development
is an independent research and policy organi-
zation of some 250 business leaders and edu-
cators. CED is nonprofit, nonpartisan, and non-
political. Its purpose is to propose policies that
bring about steady economic growth at high
employment and reasonably stable prices, in-
creased productivity and living standards,
greater and more equal opportunity for every
citizen, and an improved quality of life for all.
All CED policy recommendations must
have the approval of trustees on the Research
and Policy Committee. This Committee is
directed under the bylaws, which emphasize
that “all research is to be thoroughly objective
in character, and the approach in each instance
is to be from the standpoint of the general
welfare and not from that of any special politi-
cal or economic group.” The Committee is
aided by a Research Advisory Board of lead-
ing social scientists and by a small permanent
professional staff.
The Research and Policy Committee does
not attempt to pass judgment on any pending
specific legislative proposals; its purpose is to
urge careful consideration of the objectives set
forth in this statement and of the best means of
accomplishing those objectives.
Each statement is preceded by extensive
discussions, meetings, and exchange of memo-
randa. The research is undertaken by a sub-
committee, assisted by advisors chosen for their
competence in the field under study.
The full Research and Policy Committee
participates in the drafting of recommenda-
tions. Likewise, the trustees on the drafting
subcommittee vote to approve or disapprove
a policy statement, and they share with the
Research and Policy Committee the privilege
of submitting individual comments for publi-
cation.
Except for the members of the Research and
Policy Committee and the responsible subcommit-
tee, the recommendations presented herein are not
necessarily endorsed by other trustees or by the
advisors, contributors, staff members, or others
associated with CED.
RESPONSIBILITY FOR CED STATEMENTS ON NATIONAL POLICY
iv
RESEARCH AND POLICY COMMITTEE
*Voted to approve the policy statement but submitted memoranda of comment, reservation, or dissent. See page 38.
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This statement is intended to bring together
within a common analytic framework a wide
array of social and economic issues faced by
our nation. The framework, constructed
around the objectives of economic growth and
economic opportunity, emphasizes the role of
investment in a coherent policy agenda that
cuts across issues, agencies, and budgets.
This statement is a comprehensive presen-
tation of principles. We believe that many eco-
nomic policy issues, despite their complexity
in the details, can be clarified by attention to
broad analytic principles. Unfortunately, these
principles are often neglected in a political
environment heavily influenced by special-
interest pleading, partisan maneuvering,
sound bites, and fragmented debate. We have
therefore attempted to “go back to basics” on
a group of issues central to the pursuit of
economic growth and opportunity, pulling
these issues together into a consistent and
ambitious policy agenda.
We offer six general recommendations
based on CED’s work in policy arenas as
diverse as education and international trade.
PURPOSE OF THIS STATEMENT
Each recommendation highlights the most
important aspects of that issue. These recom-
mendations are based largely on extensive
research detailed in the referenced recent CED
statements. The reader is encouraged to con-
sult these statements for more detailed analy-
sis and discussion of these issues.
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1For over half a century, CED has advo-
cated business and public policies that would
enhance the opportunities for all Americans
to improve their lives. Each CED policy report
contains a clear statement of these basic goals:
“steady economic growth at high employment and
reasonably stable prices, increasing productivity
and living standards, and . . . greater and more
equal opportunity for every citizen.”1
In addressing a broad range of policy is-
sues, CED has argued that economic growth
and economic opportunity are usually comple-
mentary. Without growth, resources will be
unavailable to widen opportunity. Without
broadly available opportunity, we will fail to
fulfill the democratic charge of the nation’s
founders and may reduce our potential for
economic growth as well.
Several decades ago, Americans felt confi-
dent that the prevailing rising economic tide
lifted all boats. Strong economic growth dur-
ing the quarter century after World War II
seemed to automatically provide “greater and
more equal opportunity for every citizen,” and
real incomes grew at a healthy 2-3 percent
annual rate for families in all income
groups.✝ 2 More recently, however, both the
strength of the tide and its lift for the smaller
boats have diminished. Growth of labor pro-
ductivity and average real wages slowed
sharply after the early 1970s; family income
growth slowed less only because of the in-
crease in two-earner families. At the same time,
these slowly growing incomes became less
evenly distributed, and the proportion of fami-
lies living in poverty increased, as the labor
market weakened for workers who lacked
advanced education and higher skills.
This conjunction of slower growth with a
weaker link between growth and broad eco-
nomic opportunity is pushing the fruits of
growth out of reach of a larger proportion of
the population. Public policies designed to
broaden opportunity have not taken up the
slack. For example, the real value of the Pell
grant (the primary higher education grant pro-
gram for financially needy students) has
dropped as the cost of higher education has
sky-rocketed during the past 15 years. Some
programs, such as Aid to Families with
Dependent Children (AFDC), may have done
more to promote dependency than to extend
opportunity.
We believe it essential that our economic
and social policies be directed at both growth
INTRODUCTION
✝The discussions of productivity, real output, and real incomes
in this report reflect official measures of inflation. It appears
likely that official measures of inflation are overstated, as has
been reported by the “Boskin Commission” (see Toward a More
Accurate Measure of the Cost of Living, Final Report to the Senate
Finance Committee from the Advisory Commission to Study
the Consumer Price Index, December 4, 1996). This implies that
the growth of productivity, real output, and real incomes is
correspondingly understated. However, the slowdown of pro-
ductivity, real output, and real income growth since the early
1970s would be overstated only if the upward bias in inflation
measures increased significantly (and rather abruptly), which is
much less certain. Furthermore, an overestimate of inflation is
unlikely to have raised the measured increase in inequality of
wages and incomes. In fact, it may have produced an under-
statement of such dispersion, since new goods and services and
those most subject to mismeasured quality improvements (e.g.
computers, health care, cellular telephones) tend to be more
important in high-income than in low-income budgets.
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2and opportunity. We recognize that the two
goals may sometimes conflict, but we are con-
vinced that such conflicts can be resolved. The
future well-being of American society does
not rest in the pursuit of one to the exclusion
of the other.*
The design of growth and opportunity poli-
cies is crucial. For example, if, in the name of
“opportunity,” we devise anti-poverty pro-
grams that create dependency rather than
opportunity, we will fail both to enhance
opportunity and to develop human capital
conducive to growth. Similarly, if, in the name
of “growth,” we pursue tax cuts that raise
A recent research project chaired by the
Nobel laureate economist Robert Solow used
an “unproductive resources” approach to
assess the cost of poverty in the United
States.a The research team used four different
methodologies to estimate the lost economic
output related to childhood poverty. All four
used the shortfall in future earnings of poor
children as an estimate of the reduction in
their contribution to economic output. When
calculating earnings losses on the basis of
educational attainment alone, researchers esti-
mated a loss in future economic output of
budget deficits and reduce national saving and
investment, we will reduce both growth and
the resources available to extend opportunity.3
We believe that well-designed policies and
programs that encourage growth and expand
opportunity can be not only complementary,
but also mutually reinforcing (see “Poverty as
an Opportunity Lost,” below). Ultimately,
growth is necessary to provide the new
avenues for personal advancement and
resources to expand opportunities, and the
expansion of opportunities to all Americans,
in turn, will raise the economic capacity of our
society.
$36-98 billion each year, so long as current
levels of poverty continue.
The study’s most comprehensive estimate,
which included the additional costs of other
poverty-related factors such as unemploy-
ment, lower skill-attainment abilities, and
higher incidences of poor health, was much
higher — $177 billion, or about three percent
of gross domestic product (GDP), annually.
(a) Arloc Sherman, Wasting America’s Future: The
Children’s Defense Fund Report on the Costs of Child
Poverty, (Boston) Beacon Press, 1994.
POVERTY AS AN OPPORTUNITY LOST
*See memorandum by JAMES Q. RIORDAN, (page 38).
3THE GROWTH RECORD
The United States experienced a period of
extraordinary economic growth in the quarter
century following World War II. From 1947 to
1973, real domestic output increased at an
average annual rate of 4 percent, raising per
capita output by two-thirds.
By all accounts, most American families
became better off during these so-called
“golden years.” Real family incomes more than
doubled between 1947 and 1973. At the same
time, families were becoming smaller, so that
the average family spread its income among
fewer members in 1973 than in 1947.✝
Not only did the “average” citizen become
substantially better off during this period, but
real incomes rose dramatically for those at
the lower end of the income distribution.
Between 1949 and 1969, the proportion of
Americans living in poverty fell from 40 per-
cent to 14 percent.4
 Other measures of well-being also reflected
this rapid progress. For example, average life
expectancy rose from 68 years in 1950 to 72
years only a quarter century later.5 Over the
30-year period from 1940 to 1970, home own-
ership increased from 44 to 63 percent of all
households and access to indoor plumbing
rose from 55 to 93 percent.6 These are just a
few indicators of what came to be known as
the “American dream,” a term that entered
the nation’s lexicon during the dynamic post-
war years.
But the vigorous national and family in-
come growth that characterized this period
faltered in the early 1970s, when the growth of
labor productivity dropped sharply. Figure 1,
page 4, shows the difference in income growth
between the two periods. A careful look at the
impact of this productivity slowdown on eco-
nomic growth and workers’ compensation
helps to explain the changes of the last two
decades.
PRODUCTIVITY: THE ENGINE OF
ECONOMIC GROWTH
Productivity, or output produced per unit
of input, is the primary characteristic of eco-
nomic growth and the ultimate determinant
of per capita incomes and living standards
(see “Sources of Growth — More Hours Ver-
sus More Output per Hour,” page 7). The most
commonly used measure of productivity is
labor productivity, or output per hour of work,
both because it is most closely associated with
living standards and because it is the measure
for which the richest data are available. In
spite of short-term fluctuations in the share of
national income received by labor, the rela-
tionship between productivity growth and real
worker compensation has been strong and re-
markably stable over time,7 so that the rapid
productivity improvements during the
“golden years” translated into large gains in
workers’ earnings and compensation.
ECONOMIC GROWTH
✝ In fact, adjustments for the change in family size dur-
ing 1967-1973 suggest that size-adjusted average family
income grew about 25 percent faster than the unad-
justed measure. See U.S. House of Representatives,
Committee on Ways and Means, 1994 Green Book, (Wash-
ington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1994),
P. 1186.
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4As Figure 2, page 6, shows, productivity
grew on average by 2.9 percent per year from
1959 (the earliest year for which comparable
data are available) to 1973, well above its long-
term trend of just over 2 percent. The produc-
tivity record after 1973 was dismal by com-
parison; from 1973 to 1995, productivity growth
averaged little more than 1 percent, a decline
of nearly two-thirds from the earlier period,
and half its long-term trend.
The reasons for the apparent productivity
slowdown are not fully understood. A small
portion of it can be attributed to a reduction in
the growth of capital employed per worker
and to increased regulatory burdens. How-
ever none of it can be traced statistically to
slower improvements in the education and
experience of the work force or reduced in-
vestments in research and development. It is
likely that overestimated inflation and other
measurement problems, particularly in the in-
creasingly important services sector, have led
to underestimated growth in output and pro-
ductivity, but it is uncertain whether these
problems have become more severe over time.8✝
RECOMMENDATIONS TO RAISE
ECONOMIC GROWTH
Our inability to explain fully why produc-
tivity growth collapsed does not mean we are
powerless to raise it. We know as a matter of
research, observation, and common sense that
the productivity of the work force is related to
its motivation, education, training, and skills,
to the amount of capital with which it works,
and to the rate of improvement and effective
application of new technology. Cost-effective
improvements in these areas point the way to
stronger growth.
Policies to increase the productivity of the
work force and thereby raise economic growth
✝ As noted in the footnote on page 1, overestimates of inflation
probably reduced measured productivity growth, but only in-
creasingly severe overestimates would produce a slowdown in
productivity growth. While increasing measurement is quite
plausible, there is little evidence to demonstrate it, much less to
indicate its magnitude over the last several decades. The Boskin
Commission report discusses individual cases that imply both
increasing and decreasing measurement error.
The Slowdown in Family Income Growth(a)
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(a) Median family income in 1994, CPI-U-X1 dollars.
SOURCE: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census.
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5fall into three broad categories. These policies
should:
 • increase the private capital stock through
higher national saving;
 • shift public spending away from consump-
tion and toward productive investment;
 • encourage more open and efficient mar-
kets at home and abroad.
In each of these areas, public policies can
enhance or retard economic growth. Unfor-
tunately, much of the current popular discus-
sion of economic growth inappropriately over-
looks the fundamental determinants of growth.
For example, there has been undue emphasis
on expansionary monetary policy, which is
unlikely to affect long-term growth (see
“Monetary Policy: What It Can and Cannot
Do,” page 8). Similarly, while reductions in
marginal tax rates may have some positive
effect on growth, they are almost certainly
less effective than deficit reduction (see fol-
lowing section).9
and public infrastructure✝✝✝ — is the subcom-
ponent that we can most readily measure. Gen-
erally, the more physical capital workers have
to support them, the more productive they
will be. U.S. workers have had more capital to
work with than have workers in other coun-
tries, which partly explains the higher levels
of productivity in the United States.
In addition to increasing the capital stock,
new plant and equipment often embody new
technology and thereby improve the quality of
capital. Replacement and upgrading of
machines, structures, and transportation and
communications systems ultimately produce
major productivity improvements. It has been
estimated that as much as 80 percent of the
technical progress contributing to U.S. eco-
nomic growth is embodied in new investment.
If the productivity improvements resulting
from “embodied technical progress” are
attributed to the capital that contains it, new
investment can be said to account for roughly
three-quarters of increases in labor productiv-
ity.10
Net domestic investment has fallen by
roughly half over the past three decades, from
about 10 percent of net national product in the
1960s and 1970s to about 5 1/2 percent in the
1990s, although in 1994-1995 it rose to 7 per-
✝✝✝ As part of a broad revision of the National Income
Accounts in 1996, the U.S. Department of Commerce now clas-
sifies additions to the public capital stock as investments rather
than consumption. Before this revision, official estimates con-
sistently understated national investment and saving by
excluding an important component of investment. As a result
of this change, estimates of national investment and saving are
higher than in previous CED reports.
 RECOMMENDATION 1
DEFICITS AND NATIONAL
SAVING✝
To increase private capital formation, we
should raise net national (i.e., private and
public) saving to its pre-1980 average of
roughly 10 percent of net national product.
This would require a modest structural (or
“high-employment”)✝✝ federal budget sur-
plus. Timely action is imperative; because of
the huge projected increase in long-term bud-
get deficits, delay will make adjustment more
painful and politically more difficult.
✝ See the following CED statements: Restoring Prosperity: Budget
Choices for Economic Growth (1992), Cut Spending First: Tax Cuts
Should Be Deferred to Ensure a Balanced Budget (1995).
✝✝ In contrast to the actual deficit, a “structural” or “high
employment” budget deficit is the deficit that would occur
under current policies if the economy were operating at its full
potential. As CED has argued in fiscal policy statements for
over 40 years, structural rather than actual surplus is the appro-
priate policy goal because it would allow for actual deficits (or
smaller surpluses) during recessions in order to boost eco-
nomic activity.
Productivity ultimately depends on invest-
ments in capital, broadly defined: physical
capital, human capital, and the expansion of
knowledge through research. Investment in
physical capital — business plant, equipment,
6cent (see Figure 4, page 9).✝ Lower national
saving, the sum of private saving and govern-
ment saving (or dissaving in the case of bud-
get deficits) has largely determined the
diminished resources available for investment
(see “Saving at Home or Borrowing from
Abroad,” page 10). Net national saving has
fallen even more dramatically than investment,
from a pre-1980 average of 11 percent of net
national product to 4 percent in the 1990s.
The decline in national saving reflects
declines in both private and public saving.
Private households have increasingly shifted
income from saving to additional consump-
tion (see Figure 5, page 9); recent private con-
sumption rates have rivaled those of the pe-
riod immediately following World War II,
when pent-up demand from the war years led
to an unprecedented post-war consumption
boom.
The impact of declining personal saving
on the national saving rate has been com-
pounded by federal budget deficits, which con-
stitute public dissaving. Federal deficits cur-
rently absorb about one-third of private saving,
crowding out private investment by raising
real interest rates. Figure 7, page 11, shows
that in the years before 1980, net saving by all
levels of government was positive on average,
which added to national saving. After 1980,
however, the government sector moved into
the red, which reduced national saving. If gov-
ernment saving had been zero during the first
half of the 1990s, the national saving rate would
have been about 50 percent higher — nearly 6
percent of net national product instead of 4
percent.
The Productivity Slowdown(a)
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(a) Output per hour of all persons, non-farm business sector.
SOURCE: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics.
Figure 2
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Trend = 2.9%
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✝ “Net investment” and “net national product” are net of “capi-
tal consumption,” a charge in the National Income Accounts
for the scrapping and obsolescence of fixed capital. Net rather
than gross investment is used here because it better describes
the quantitative increase in the capital stock that contributes to
future output growth. However, these “net” measures do not
capture the higher productivity of new capital or that resulting
from upgrading and improvement of existing capital; produc-
tivity increases resulting from such technological improvements
are captured in measures of “technical progress.”
7While we should endeavor to raise both
public and private saving, the most certain
and effective policy to increase national sav-
ing is to eliminate the government dissaving
resulting from federal budget deficits. With
this in mind, we welcomed the public com-
mitments of Congress and the President in
1995 and 1996 to the goal of a balanced federal
SOURCES OF GROWTH—MORE HOURS VERSUS MORE OUTPUT PER HOUR
Changes in hours worked and in output-
per-hour worked (productivity) by definition
account for economic growth. Both have con-
tributed significantly to growth in the U.S.
economy since World War II, but it is the
latter that largely accounts for Americans
being “better off.” Increases in rates of labor-
force participation (or in the average work-
week) are not as unambiguously associated
with improvements in “well-being” as are
increases in productivity. A family that
doubles its income by doubling the number
of hours spent at work is generally not as well
off as it would be if its income had doubled
through higher wages. It is through improve-
ments in productivity that higher wages are
possible.
An increase in hours worked through
higher rates of labor-force participation has
been a significant source of economic growth
over the past 50 years, and particularly in the
past 20 years, when it accounted for over half
of economic growth.
This trend is reflected in an increase in the
number of earners per family: the ratio of
multiple-earner to one-earner households has
increased steadily in recent years. This in-
crease typically has meant more female family
members going to work. But as Figure 3
shows, the growth in female labor-force par-
ticipation has flattened during the 1990’s, and
overall labor-force participation, with that of
men continuing to decline, has leveled off as a
consequence.
Labor Force Participation Rates
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NOTE: Data refer to persons 16 years and over.  Pre-1994 participation rates are corrected for effects of the revised Current
Population Survey questionnaire.
SOURCE: U.S. Department of Labor and Council of Economic Advisers.
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8budget by 2002. At no time in the past 20 years
had the climate been as favorable for elimina-
tion of the deficits that have plagued our na-
tional governance. The failure to enact measures
that would achieve this goal indicates a failure of
political leadership. The budget plans and nego-
tiating strategies of both the President and
Congress served more to harden partisan
Continuing low inflation during the
current economic expansion and a belief that
current price measures overstate inflation have
led some to argue that faster economic growth
without higher inflation is possible through a
more expansionary monetary policy. The
requirements for faster long-term growth of
output are unambiguous: The economy cannot
grow faster than the sum of increases in hours
worked by the labor force and labor-force productiv-
ity. Unfortunately, this basic principle is often
ignored in arguments for monetary expansion.
Such arguments frequently confuse an
increase in the long-term, sustainable rate of
growth (the growth rate of “potential output”)
with a short-term increase in output to its full
capacity or potential level. In doing so, these
arguments also display a misunderstanding of
the economic effects of monetary expansion.
A higher sustainable growth rate (which
would indeed produce large economic ben-
efits) is achievable only through faster growth
of labor inputs, higher rates of investment, or
more rapid technical progress, including gains
in managerial organization and efficiency. We
can and should adopt policies that raise such “sup-
ply-side” determinants of long-term growth, but
they cannot be raised by monetary expansion.
Monetary expansion raises demand and, conse-
quently, could raise the level of output and
employment on a one-time basis, if there were
significant unemployed capacity. Such a
“demand-side” boost would raise output
growth, briefly and temporarily, until full
capacity was reached. But it would not raise
the sustainable growth rate, and it would raise
inflation if maintained after the slack in the
economy had been eliminated.
Some advocates of a looser monetary policy
argue that the information revolution, more
efficient production processes, a more open
MONETARY POLICY: WHAT IT CAN AND CANNOT DO
economy, and “underemployment” of indi-
viduals outside the measured labor force imply
a level of potential output and/or a sustainable
growth rate higher than that accommodated
by the Federal Reserve Board. However, the
experience of 1994-1996, when the economy
was growing at its potential of 2 to 2 1/2 per-
cent annually, does not support this view. If
the economy had been operating significantly
below its potential during this period, the
unemployment rate would have risen and
wage inflation fallen. Neither, in fact, occurred.
A final argument sometimes made is that
the widely recognized overstatement of infla-
tion by official measures offers a rationale for
monetary expansion. Lower inflation, it is sug-
gested, provides the Fed more leeway to allow
faster growth. This argument, however, is
clearly wrong. If inflation is overstated, then
economic growth (the estimate of which
depends on the inflation estimate) must be
understated, and we are already “growing
faster.” Still faster growth would require an
increase in the supply factors, which could not
be provided by monetary expansion, for the
reasons noted above.
Recent monetary policy has been highly
successful, by historical standards, in sustain-
ing economic growth with low inflation. This
recent success should not be placed lightly at
risk. We should not forget the economic distor-
tions produced by the high inflation of the
1970s and the heavy costs of the severe reces-
sion required to end it. We agree that the mon-
etary authorities should cautiously explore the
possibility that changes in the economy have
raised the level of economic activity compatible
with low inflation. Recent Federal Reserve
policy suggests to us that this is, in fact, what
the Fed has been doing.
9The Decline in Investment and Saving(a)
12
10
8
6
4
2
0
(a) Net national investment and net national saving as a percentage of net national product.
SOURCE: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis.
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Resources for national investment must
come either from saving at home or from bor-
rowing from abroad. An increase in foreign
borrowing is necessarily reflected in a country’s
balance of trade. Figure 6 shows this relation-
ship for the U.S. economy over the past 35
years. From 1959 to 1981, when national saving
outpaced domestic investment, the U.S. net
foreign investment position — determined
principally by the balance of exports and
imports — was usually positive. Since then,
as national saving has fallen below domestic
investment, net foreign investment has been
necessarily negative.
The trade deficit has consistently received
attention as an important source of America’s
economic woes in recent years. Yet, almost
none of this attention has focused on the funda-
SAVING AT HOME OR BORROWING FROM ABROAD
mental cause of the trade deficit — our low
national saving. The “economic problem”
represented by the trade deficit is principally
a deficiency of domestic saving, which
reduces domestic resources available for
investment and forces us instead to import
resources from abroad. By relying on
resources from abroad rather than domestic
saving, the United States is borrowing against
future income, requiring payments of interest
and dividends to foreign lenders. The more
persistent foreign borrowing becomes, the
worse our terms of borrowing are likely to be;
higher interest rates may be required to
induce foreigners to hold still more U.S.
assets, increasing further the future flow of
domestic resources abroad, and reducing
incomes in the United States.
positions than to foster compromise and even-
tual agreement.*
Major shortcomings of both budget plans,
but especially that of the Congress, were the
proposals for large tax cuts, which would likely
raise deficits and reduce national saving. As
CED argued in June 1995, “net reductions in
revenues before a balanced budget is assured
Saving, Investment, and the Trade Balance(a)
Figure 6
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*See memorandum by JAMES Q. RIORDAN, (page 38).
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would be a grave mistake.”11 The tax cut pro-
posals contributed to the impasse in the over-
all budget negotiations, producing a fruitless
and acrimonious debate about who should
benefit from a tax cut and which spending
cuts have “paid for” it — exactly the outcome
we warned against when tax cuts were first
proposed.12 *
Because the basic requirement for stronger
economic growth is higher national saving, not
higher private saving per se, our support for
tax incentives to increase private saving is
qualified. After much public and academic
debate, the evidence that tax-based saving
incentives such as liberalized Individual
Retirement Accounts and Family Saving
Accounts would, in themselves, raise the rate
of national saving is mixed at best.13
A tax-based saving incentive will only
increase national saving if the net effect of the
resulting changes in private and public saving
is positive. This requires that any revenue loss
to the U.S. Treasury (a reduction in public sav-
ing) be more than offset by an increase in
private saving. This is a difficult test to pass. A
tax-based saving incentive that is fully financed
by cutting spending (or raising other revenues)
is likely to increase national saving. Even so,
the increase in national saving would almost
certainly be larger if spending cuts were
devoted to deficit reduction rather than to
financing tax reductions.14 Consequently, we
believe the House Budget Committee Repub-
lican staff was correct when it concluded in
1991 that “there is no tax incentive that promotes
growth as effectively as deficit reduction”
[emphasis in the original].15
At the same time, the current tax code
often favors consumption over investment,
with similar costs in lower productivity
Both Public and Private Saving(a) Have Declined
1960-1969                                                1970-1979                                                 1980-1989                                                  1990-1995
Figure 7
Years
(a) Net national saving, net private saving, and net government saving as a percentage of net national product.
Net government saving includes federal, state, and local government.
SOURCE: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis.
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growth. For example, the exclusion from tax-
able income of employer-provided health
insurance raises consumption of health care.
Similarly, the mortgage interest deduction for
owner-occupied housing shifts investment
resources to housing “at the expense of other
investments which directly enhance produc-
tivity.”16  Our tax laws should be modified to
eliminate the current bias towards consump-
tion and against productivity-enhancing
investments.
In 1997, our political leadership should keep
in mind the experience of the past two years
in budget negotiations. This time, they should
put aside talk of tax cuts and complete the
business of balancing the budget.
THE LONG-TERM BUDGET OUTLOOK
Although the budget deficit has fallen
recently, both in absolute value and as a per-
centage of GDP, the long-term budget out-
look is truly alarming, primarily because of
entitlement trends. As a result, CED’s long-
standing concern about deficits and their
adverse impact on economic growth and
opportunity takes on a new urgency.
Recent simulations by the nonpartisan Con-
gressional Budget Office (CBO) and others
show clearly the unsustainability of the cur-
rent fiscal path. CBO projects that, under
current policies, the federal budget deficit
would increase from 2 percent to 37 percent of
GDP, and the national debt would jump from
51 percent to 293 percent of GDP in 35 years.
The crowding out of growth-enhancing in-
vestment by these fiscal burdens implies that
per-capita output would begin to fall within
25 years.17
There are two principal reasons for this
impending explosion of the budget deficit and
public debt. First, the aging and retirement of
the Baby Boomers will require much higher
outlays for Social Security, and especially for
Medicare and Medicaid. Second, the rising
relative cost of health care will further increase
Medicare and Medicaid costs. These problems
are fundamental and relatively intractable.
According to CBO, our fiscal path remains
unsustainable “even under optimistic assump-
tions, including favorable demographic trends
and historically high rates of productivity
growth.”18  This conclusion is buttressed by
similar independent analyses done by the Gen-
eral Accounting Office (GAO) and the Office
of Management and Budget (OMB).19
The unsustainability of current fiscal poli-
cies is confirmed by an analysis of “genera-
tional accounting,” which addresses the ques-
tion: What taxes on the lifetime incomes of
Americans yet unborn would be required to pay
for currently projected federal expenditures?20
While answers to this question are quite sensi-
tive to the assumptions made, one recent esti-
mate suggests that net tax rates would more
than double, rising to an estimated 85 percent
from the current estimate of 34 percent for the
cohort born between 1960 and 1993.21
Such projections are not forecasts of what
will happen, since the adverse economic
effects of such rapid debt accumulation pre-
sumably would force painful policy changes
long before these outcomes were reached. Nev-
ertheless, these analytic exercises dramatize
the size of the problem as well as the urgent
need for timely action. The longer the inevi-
table policy changes are delayed, the larger,
more abrupt, and more painful they will be.
Moreover, the political difficulty of change
will increase as the elderly grow as a propor-
tion of the electorate.
We urge the political leadership, particu-
larly the Administration, to acknowledge the
necessity of major reforms in Medicare, espe-
cially those features of the program related to
cost sharing. Until the long-term fiscal integ-
rity of Medicare, and, indeed, Social Security
are restored, there will be no chance of long-
term budgetary balance.22 We fully appreciate
the political difficulty of programmatic
reforms. But such changes cannot be avoided
for long, and it is the responsibility of our
political leadership to address them.
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Just as deficits have crowded out private
investment in the capital stock, public con-
sumption expenditures have crowded out in-
vestments within the federal budget. Invest-
ments in physical capital, research and
development (R&D), and human capital have
been a declining portion of the federal budget,
falling from about 32 percent of total federal
outlays in the early 1960s to about 16 percent
today (see Figure 8). These investments have
also fallen significantly relative to GDP, from
about 6.2 percent in the early 1960s to just
over 3 percent today.23
Both R&D and human capital investments
contribute to technical progress, which may
account for more than half of U.S. productiv-
ity growth.24 Technical progress is a broad
measure of society’s increased capacity to use
physical resources. It captures improvements
from R&D (through new products and pro-
duction processes), from human capital
(through more skilled workers and more effi-
cient work arrangements), and from other
improvements in production processes that
are not readily measured (such as “learning
by doing”).
Financing R&D has long been both a pri-
vate and public undertaking in the United
States. While private investment in R&D has
surpassed public levels over the past two
decades, both public and private spending
have declined relative to total output during
the 1990s. Improvements in human resources,
through education and training, are necessary
not only to keep pace with and thereby apply
technical advances, but also to expand the
economic capacities of less-skilled members
of society. Although difficult to measure,
increases in the formal educational attainment
of the work force alone have been estimated
to account for roughly 20 percent of produc-
tivity increases in the last several decades.25
Likewise, there appears to be a strong rela-
tionship between labor force quality (measured
by cognitive skills in mathematics and sci-
ence) and economic growth.26
✝ See the following CED statements: Investing in America’s
Future: Challenges and Opportunities for Public Sector Economic
Policies (1988), Restoring Prosperity: Budget Choices for Economic
Growth (1992). See also Fixing Social Security (1997).
The Crowding Out of
Federal Investment:(a)
Investment as a Percentage of Total
Federal Outlays, 1962-1995
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(a) Federal investment is defined by the Office of Management
and Budget as outlays for physical capital, research and
development, and education and training.
SOURCE: Budget of the United States Government, Historical
Tables, Fiscal Year 1997.
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RECOMMENDATION 2
BUDGET PRIORITIES✝
The federal government should adopt an
investment-oriented federal budget and
an investment-oriented deficit reduction
program that will build capital (human and
technological, as well as physical) and
enhance productivity growth. The first step
is to reform the nation’s unsustainable
entitlement programs.
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The budgetary crowding out of public
investments since the 1970s is related closely
to the explosive growth in entitlement spend-
ing. Most entitlement programs are transfers
of income from taxpayers to beneficiaries —
usually from younger taxpayers to older
recipients — that provide little in the way of
future returns and may entail significant effi-
ciency losses in the economy. Neither party’s
political leadership has been willing to
address the looming insolvency of Social
Security and recent efforts (by Congress more
than the Administration) to scale back growth
in Medicare spending have been unsuccess-
ful.
The shift in budgetary priorities is clear:
while investment has fallen from 32 percent of
the federal budget in 1962 to 16 percent in
1995, entitlement spending has grown from
20 percent to 48 percent. The budget propos-
als by both the Congress and the Administra-
tion in 1995 would have continued this expan-
sion of entitlement spending at the expense of
investment and other discretionary spending.
For example, in order to reach balance by the
year 2002, both plans would have placed
“caps” on discretionary spending that imply
reductions in R&D investment of as much as
one-third of current levels.
In the process of eliminating deficits, U.S.
policy makers should establish budget spend-
ing priorities that give larger weight to future
returns. Productive economic activity depends
upon private and public investment. We
recognize that labeling public spending as
“investment” does not make it so, and that
many so-called public “investment” activities
would fail market tests of usefulness, effi-
ciency, and competitive returns. Nevertheless,
effectively chosen and designed public invest-
ments in physical capital, R&D, and human
capital (such as education and training) are
essential to economic growth, as they have
been throughout our history.
About one-third of total budget spending
is discretionary (approximately half of which
is for national defense) and two-thirds is
entitlement spending (including interest on
the debt). Investment programs are found prin-
cipally in the “discretionary” portion of the
federal budget and are generally funded
through annual appropriation laws. Entitle-
ment programs, on the other hand, are funded
automatically according to statutory formu-
las. Discretionary programs are politically less
difficult to cut than entitlement programs,
which provide benefits to millions of (princi-
pally elderly) voters. Consequently, discretion-
ary spending has borne the brunt of recent
deficit-reduction efforts. Further, annual piece-
meal cuts in the discretionary budget make
long-term investment programs particularly
difficult to plan and implement successfully.
The disappointing budget outcomes for fis-
cal years 1996 and 1997 dramatically illustrate
this problem. The limited agreements between
the President and Congress made most of the
spending cuts in discretionary (often invest-
ment) programs. Both the President and Con-
gress assume large additional reductions from
this shrinking group of discretionary programs
in future years in order to project a balanced
budget. Most experienced budget observers
believe that discretionary cuts of this magni-
tude would be highly disruptive in many pro-
grams and are therefore unlikely to happen.
This further underscores the importance of
restraining the growth of entitlement pro-
grams.
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REGULATION
Regulation in many fields — including the
environment, health, and safety — is neces-
sary in our complex society. The benefits of
regulation are both commonplace and dra-
matic, from standards that ensure food safety
to burgeoning recreation on cleaner, healthier
waterways.
There is growing evidence and awareness,
however, that regulation often fails to achieve
its goals or does so inefficiently at unneces-
sarily high costs. Furthermore, it sometimes
has the effect of protecting vested interests
more than consumers. Aggregate regulatory
compliance costs to the private sector for fed-
eral regulations are currently on the order of
$670 billion annually, or about one-tenth of
GDP.27 The growing regulatory burden dur-
ing the 1960s and 1970s is estimated to
account for 13 to 30 percent of the productiv-
ity (and wage) slowdown during the 1970s.28
Regrettably, calls for regulatory reform are
often portrayed as “anti-regulation.” This gen-
erally wrong-headed characterization confuses
regulatory goals with the means of achieving
them. We do not oppose most regulatory goals.
Our long-standing advocacy of regulatory re-
form is rooted rather in a search for efficiency
— in the conviction that environmental and
other goals often can be reached at smaller
costs of necessarily scarce resources.
All regulations involve tradeoffs between
the benefits they provide and the costs of
achieving them. Cost-benefit and risk analy-
ses, whether formal or informal, are useful in
assessing these inevitable tradeoffs. These ana-
lytic tools are not definitive, but they should
not be viewed as roadblocks in the regulatory
process. On the contrary, by detailing the ef-
fects and costs of a proposed regulation, cost-
benefit and risk analyses can guide regulators
toward less costly designs and more effective
implementation strategies.
Principles of cost-benefit and risk analysis
are important at all stages of the regulatory
process. Too often, regulatory agencies — at
the federal, state, and local levels — lack the
flexibility to use proper cost-benefit or other
analyses due to narrow guidelines written into
regulatory statutes. Lawmakers should pro-
vide regulators with wider discretion to
determine the most effective means of achiev-
ing regulatory goals. At the same time, this
wider discretion will only be effective if regu-
lators themselves pay close attention to effi-
ciency principles as they exercise discretion
in implementing regulations.
As problems that require regulation
become increasingly complex, rules that are
rigid, centralized, and uniform are unlikely to
be successful and almost certain to be ineffi-
cient. Market-based mechanisms — such as
emission taxes and tradable pollution permits
 RECOMMENDATION 3
OPEN AND EFFICIENT
MARKETS✝
More open and efficient markets (at home
and abroad) can raise productivity and
growth. Regulations imposed without due
attention to costs and impediments to inter-
national trade and investment create signifi-
cant barriers to achieving our full productive
potential as a nation. Therefore:
 • To reduce the economic costs of regula-
tions and maximize their effectiveness,
regulatory regimes should be developed
in the context of cost-benefit and risk
analyses and should favor flexible,
market-based mechanisms over rigid,
command-and-control structures;
 • The United States should continue to lead
global efforts to open markets for goods,
services, and capital.
✝ See the following CED statements: What Price Clean Air: A
Market Approach to Energy and Environmental Policy (1993), Rede-
fining Government’s Role in the Market System (1979), Investing in
America’s Future: Challenges and Opportunities for Public Sector
Economic Policies (1988), The United States in the New Global
Economy: A Rallier of Nations (1992), U.S. Trade Policy Beyond the
Uruguay Round (1994), In Our Best Interest: NAFTA and the New
Economy (1994).
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— are generally preferable to traditional com-
mand-and-control regulatory approaches. It
often will be far more effective and less costly
to define broad goals, rather than technically
specified results, and then to design regula-
tions that rely more on market-determined
incentives and behavior to achieve these
goals.29
INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND
INVESTMENT
U.S. economic progress has increasingly
relied upon a dynamic global economy, to the
alarm of some but the benefit of most. The
United States and a growing number of its
trading partners have worked steadily over a
half-century to create more open markets for
trade and investment. The increasing impact
of international markets is reflected in the dra-
matic growth of U.S. exports and imports in
recent years, both in absolute terms and in
relation to our total economic output (see Fig-
ure 9). The United States is the world’s largest
importer and exporter of goods and services;
trade (the value of exports plus imports) has
risen from 9 percent of GDP in 1960 to about
22 percent today. Export growth in the last
several years has accounted for roughly one-
third of U.S. economic growth.
Trade and global expansion contribute to
U.S. prosperity in several ways. First, interna-
tional competition forces U.S. firms to be more
efficient in order to remain competitive. Sec-
ond, both imports and more efficient domes-
tic firms give U.S. consumers greater choice
and lower prices. Finally, larger foreign mar-
kets create greater opportunities for the U.S.
export sector, where jobs pay 13 percent more
than the national average.31
Protectionist and isolationist critics of
international economic integration blame for-
eign trade and investment for domestic
unemployment and slow aggregate income
growth. We find these claims to be largely
The Rapid Growth of Trade
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uninformed and ill-founded. Trade affects the
quality of jobs, not total employment levels; as
imports “destroy” low-productivity jobs, exports
replace them with higher-productivity and higher-
wage jobs. The impact of trade on overall out-
put and incomes is positive. As we have noted,
America’s trade deficit and inadequate growth
largely reflect self-inflicted wounds related to
low national saving.
This critique, however, does illuminate one
very important issue regarding economic op-
portunity. Trade with low-income countries
and immigration into the United States prob-
ably have contributed to the reduced demand
for less-skilled American workers. As America’s
comparative advantage in production and
trade shifts further towards goods and ser-
vices that require new technology and more-
skilled workers, less-skilled workers lose their
jobs as lower-productivity industries decline.
The new, higher-wage jobs created by trade
go to those who have the skills to take advan-
tage of them. It is therefore essential that we
increase and broaden skill development in
our present and future labor force, thereby
fostering both growth and opportunity.
Vigorous global economic development
will require continuing commitments from
all countries to open their markets for goods,
services, and capital. Through enactment of
the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA) and the Uruguay Round General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) leg-
islation and leadership and support for the
new World Trade Organization (WTO), the
United States has demonstrated a strong com-
mitment to further liberalization of the global
economy. We therefore urge the Congress to
extend “fast track” authority to the Presi-
dent, the lack of which stands in the way of
future U.S. leadership in multi-lateral trade
negotiations.
The United States’ advocacy of open mar-
kets abroad is further impaired by constrained
markets at home. We should therefore pro-
mote better jobs and higher incomes by
reducing our own barriers to trade and
investment, while simultaneously we
aggressively pursue open markets abroad.
We recognize that in some instances our
market access is effectively limited by the
actions of private firms or by public policies
beyond the purview of the WTO dispute-
resolution mechanism. In such cases, direct
bilateral discussions and actions may be
appropriate. Nevertheless, in pursuing more
open foreign markets, the United States should
generally resist political pressures for bilat-
eral confrontation and unilateral action.
Unilaterally imposed sanctions, for example,
have been largely ineffective in achieving their
goals in the past and have imposed economic
costs on the sanctioning country. In most
instances, trade disputes will be more effec-
tively resolved through the dispute settlement
facilities of the WTO. The United States has
an enormous stake in the success of the WTO,
and its decisions should be respected.
American workers and consumers have
benefited significantly from foreign invest-
ments here. Foreign firms recognize the qual-
ity of the U.S. work force and economic envi-
ronment and have responded by establishing
U.S. facilities that export as well as serve the
domestic U.S. market.  For example, in recent
years, Honda has been exporting cars it makes
in Ohio to other countries, including Japan.
This foreign presence is healthy, and we
reaffirm our support for the national treat-
ment✝ of foreign companies operating in the
United States, recognizing that it is incum-
bent on these companies to pay their fair
share of American taxes.
✝National treatment is the principle that foreign investors, once
established in a country, should be treated no less favorably
than domestic enterprises with respect to national laws, regula-
tions, and administrative practices.
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THE OPPORTUNITY RECORD
CED believes that broad economic oppor-
tunity is largely consistent with, and can be
complementary to, strong and sustained eco-
nomic growth. This is not to say, however,
that unfettered markets with no public inter-
vention will automatically ensure equal eco-
nomic opportunities.
While we believe strongly that public poli-
cies should be directed at opportunities rather
than outcomes, we recognize that in practice
outcomes greatly affect opportunities, espe-
cially when viewed across generations.31
After taking into account other factors such as
education, labor market conditions, and wel-
fare benefits, parents’ incomes remain a pow-
erful predictor of children’s incomes later in
life.32 Observing the “opportunity record,”
then, requires an examination of both how
individuals and families have fared in the past
(outcomes) and how they, and particularly their
children, are positioned to advance economi-
cally in the future (access to and sources of
opportunity).
FAMILY INCOMES
The post-war period up to the early 1970s
saw a rising economic tide that indeed lifted
all boats. From 1966 to 1973,✝ American fami-
lies in all income quintiles experienced in-
come growth at a robust rate of 2 to 3 percent
annually, creating the “picket fence” effect
shown on the left side in Figure 10. By the late
1960s, a trend of strong income growth at the
bottom as well as the top of the income distri-
bution led many observers to predict that pov-
erty, as officially measured, would be elimi-
nated by 1980.33
In the last two decades, however, the eco-
nomic experience of families at different in-
come levels has diverged sharply, creating the
“staircase” effect shown on the right side in
Figure 10. Between 1973 and 1994, while fami-
lies in upper-income categories continued to
experience income growth, albeit at half the
previous rate, those at the lower end saw their
real incomes decline.✝✝*
The data in Figure 10, which use a cash
definition of income, do not reflect income
from capital gains, fringe benefits such as
employer-paid health insurance, government-
provided non-cash benefits such as food
stamps, Medicare, Medicaid, school lunches,
and rent subsidies, and the impact of taxes,
including the earned income tax credit. They
are also not adjusted for changes in family
size over time. They do, however, include gov-
ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY
✝✝As noted in the footnote on page 1, while income growth
rates would be overstated as a result of overstated inflation
measures, there is no reason to expect that a reduction in esti-
mated inflation would reduce the measured larger dispersion of
income growth rates. Indeed, more accurate inflation measures
may actually increase such dispersion, since new goods and
services and those most subject to mismeasured quality im-
provements (e.g. computers, health care, cellular telephones)
tend to be more important in high-income than in low-income
household budgets.
✝Unfortunately, data on the distribution of family income
before 1966 comparable with post-1966 data are not available.
*See memorandum by JAMES Q. RIORDAN, (page 38).
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ernment-provided cash transfers, such as
Social Security, unemployment compensation,
and public assistance.
Some of these items increase income in-
equality, while others reduce it. Taken to-
gether, the measures of income excluded from
the aggregate measure in Figure 10 moderate
the depicted inequality slightly. The Census
Bureau reports that a comprehensive measure
of income “does not change the picture of
increasing income inequality over the 1979 to
1994 period,” the period in which inequality
grew most sharply.34 This conclusion is sup-
ported by an examination of the Gini Index, a
commonly used measure of income concen-
tration. It shows that the more comprehensive
income measures produce lower overall in-
equality but do not change the size of the
increase in inequality since 1979. ✝ (There is a 10
percent increase in inequality reflected in the
Gini Index for the adjusted and unadjusted
measures).
Our concern is not with increasing pros-
perity for high-income families nor with in-
equality of incomes per se. Both are expected
and, to a degree, useful outcomes in a market-
based economy that depends on incentives.
We are, however, deeply concerned about the
recent decline in incomes at the bottom —
especially by the family breakdown, crime,
substance abuse, and abysmal educational and
✝ The Gini Index ranges from “zero” (perfect income equality
among families) to “one” (one family has all the income). In
1979 the Gini ratio based on the standard “money” definition of
income was 0.403, rising to 0.444 in 1995. Using the most com-
prehensive adjustments (including all of those mentioned above)
to the income measure, the Gini ratio would be 0.352 in 1979,
rising to 0.388 in 1995.
From Picket Fence to Staircase
Annual Growth of Family Incomes,(a) 1966 to 1994(b)
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employment opportunities associated with the
rise in poverty. Rather than declining as pro-
jected, the poverty rate has actually risen from
12 percent in the early 1970s to 14 percent
today. More alarming from a long-term per-
spective, child poverty has increased from
about 15 percent to 21 percent during this
same period.35 Measures that adjust income to
include non-cash income and benefits also
show this long-term upward trend in pov-
erty.36
ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL MOBILITY
This relatively bleak picture of declining
and stagnating incomes neglects, of course,
the substantial mobility of individual Ameri-
cans between earnings and income groups
over time.✝ Such cross-sections or “snapshots”
of the income or earnings distribution at dif-
ferent points of time do not capture changes
for specific individuals and families, who gen-
erally experience income growth as time passes
and may move up or down in the distribu-
tion. In addition, such data may compare
individuals in very different circumstances.
Clearly, if individuals and families at very
different levels of income readily switch
places over time, longer-term or lifetime in-
comes will be much less unequal than the
annual incomes used to measure “snapshot”
inequality.
Historically, the economic progress of spe-
cific individuals and families — their rise to
higher income levels over time — has been
substantial in the United States. However,
this progress has been strongly related to the
nation’s economic growth and to the normal
“life-cycle” increase of incomes as individu-
als grow older. Changes in income due to
mobility per se — the “switching” of eco-
nomic positions — is much smaller, and by
no means as high as sometimes suggested.
(See “Income Mobility in a Lake Wobegon
Society,” below). The evidence indicates that
less than half of those who start out in the
bottom quintile of family incomes progress
to a higher quintile over a moderate period of
time (typically measured over five years).37
In general, earnings mobility reduces short-
INCOME MOBILITY IN A LAKE WOBEGON SOCIETY
One widely reported estimate of mobilitya
suggests that fully 95 percent of those who
started in the bottom quintile of income in 1975
moved into higher quintiles by 1991 and that 29
percent moved into the top quintile. This dra-
matic finding would dispel many, if not all, con-
cerns about income inequality if it stood up to
scrutiny. Unfortunately, it does not. The study’s
methodology confounds income growth as a
result of the life-cycle — that is, 40-year-olds on
average have higher incomes than 24-year-olds
— with income mobility, or changes in income
relative to other individuals. Is an individual
highly economically mobile if, at the age of 32,
he earns a large multiple of what he earned at
the age of 16 as a part-time paper boy? This
study would have us believe so.
The study, in effect, compares a group of
individuals 32 years old and older in 1991 —
those who had been in the bottom income
quintile in 1975 — with a “full age” spectrum
of individuals 16 years and older in 1991.
Clearly the latter, as a group, will include
many more very low-earners than the former.
The methodology produces a “Lake
Wobegon” effect, which allows a dispropor-
tionate number of individuals in the “highly-
mobile” group to appear well above average.
(a) W. Michael Cox and Richard Alm, “By Our Own
Bootstraps: Economic Opportunity and the Dynamics
of Income Distribution,” Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas
Annual Report 1995, 1996.
✝ This is, however, much more true of inter-generational
mobility than of mobility of individuals or family units.
Access to higher education is a fundamental source of
this inter-generational mobility (see page 31).
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term “snapshot” inequality by about one-third
after five years.✝
Whatever the degree of mobility, it would
have to be increasing to counteract the recent
rise in “snapshot” inequality. However, stud-
ies of different periods have consistently found
that mobility has either declined or remained
roughly the same during the last several
decades.38 Thus, increasing “snapshot” in-
equality, absent increases in mobility, implies
falling incomes for an increasing proportion
of the population.39 It is for these individuals
that sources of opportunity appear to be most
threatened. Given limited resources, efforts to
expand opportunity should be effectively tar-
geted toward them. In order to do so, it is
necessary to understand the sources of declin-
ing opportunities and incomes and the char-
acteristics of those at the bottom of the income
scale.
DECLINING ECONOMIC
OPPORTUNITIES FOR THE
LESS SKILLED
What has produced the deterioration in
the economic prospects of low-income Ameri-
cans? Two major causes can be identified. First,
changes in the economy have reduced the
demand for the less-skilled labor of individual
family members. Second, the dramatic rise in
one-parent families has reduced the earning
capacity of the family unit.
Declining labor-market opportunities for
low-skill, low-wage workers has been pro-
nounced since the 1970s. As overall employ-
ment has grown in recent years, the employ-
ment prospects for this group of workers
(often high school dropouts) have not. High
school dropouts today experience nearly five
times the rate of unemployment of college
graduates, a rate that has remained stable over
the past decade, after worsening substantially
during the 1970s.40 Even in cases where the
public safety net has been greatly reduced, the
inability to find or hold a job has been persis-
tent among the least skilled and least edu-
cated.✝✝
The problem has racial and geographic
dimensions as well, with low-wage, urban
minorities often facing very bleak employment
prospects.41 One study of fast-food jobs in
Harlem found intense competition for job
openings. Although the successful applicants
were relatively more educated and skilled and
tended to have more job contacts than the
unsuccessful applicants, even those who were
turned down for these jobs were better edu-
cated and had more experience than the typi-
cal welfare mother.42
Still harsher economic circumstances con-
front those with so few marketable skills that
they cannot find or do not seek any legal
employment. The largest population in this
group is young, single, black men who have
dropped out of school. Their deficiencies in
skills, citizenship, and motivation place bur-
dens on society and their innate talents and
potential productivity have proved frustrat-
ingly hard for society to evoke. The combina-
tion of these factors has often nurtured an
environment filled with social pathologies
which virtually destroy or work against indi-
vidual initiative for self-improvement.
Both slower overall economic growth and
the shift in labor-market demand away from
less-educated and less-skilled workers towards
those with more skills reduced the earnings of
the former. The productivity slowdown sub-
stantially reduced the growth of average earn-
ings. Had the 1950-1973 rate of productivity
✝ This appears to be true in several European countries as well.
Earnings mobility overall is estimated to be slightly higher in
the United States than in several European countries, but the
upward mobility of low-income workers is significantly lower.
See “Earnings Inequality, Low-Paid Employment, and Earn-
ings Mobility,” Chapter 3, in Employment Outlook, (Paris: Orga-
nization for Economic Co-operation and Development, July
1996), Chart 3.6.
✝✝ After Michigan ended its general assistance program in 1991,
a large number of former recipients remained unemployed or
held jobs for only short periods of time. See Sandra Danziger
and Sheldon Danziger, “Will Welfare Recipients Find Work
When Welfare Ends?” in Welfare Reform: An Analysis of the
Issues, ed. Isabel Sawhill, (Washington, D.C.: The Urban Insti-
tute Press, 1995), pp. 41-44.
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growth continued, average real compensation
(wages and benefits) in 1995 would have been
about $30 per hour, rather than $21. At the
same time, structural changes in the economy
were further depressing earnings at lower skill
levels. New technology and new forms of work
organization that demanded more skills and
versatility appear to have been the primary
factors, while immigration of less-skilled work-
ers, imports from low-wage countries, and
the decline of unionism probably played less
important roles.43 Whatever the precise causes,
a skills premium in job opportunities and earn-
ings has emerged in recent years that rewards
educated, skilled workers and left less-
educated, low-skilled workers far behind.
Figure 11 summarizes the impact of both
the productivity slow-down and these struc-
tural changes on young male workers. Aver-
age real earnings for young males (age 25-34)
declined from $31,368 per year in 1974 to
$26,928 in 1994. If workers at all wage levels
had shared proportionately in the actual aver-
age earnings growth during these years, 1994
wages would instead have been $39,040 for
these men. And if productivity and average
earnings growth had continued at pre-1973
rates, their annual wages would have been
$56,654.
THE IMPACT OF FAMILY STRUCTURE
ON INCOMES
While these economic changes were occur-
ring, a dramatic and rapid change in the com-
position of families greatly exacerbated the
problem. The shift from married-couple fami-
lies to one-parent families has increased dra-
matically over the past 25 years (see Figure
12). The problem is particularly acute among
black families, who are disproportionately rep-
resented at the bottom of the income distribu-
tion; a majority of these families are now
Sources of Declining Earnings(a) for Young Males
Mean Income of Males (Age 25-34), 1974 and 1994
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(a) Earnings in 1994 dollars. Faster earnings growth defined as 3.0 percent per year, reflecting actual rate of productivity growth for
1960-1973. Slower earnings growth defined as 1.1 percent per year, reflecting actual productivity growth for 1973-1994.
SOURCE: Daniel McMurrer and Isabel Sawhill, unpublished data, The Urban Institute (Washington, D.C.), 1996.
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headed by single, most often female, parents.
However, the shift has proceeded rapidly
throughout our society — the number of non-
black, single-parent families rose by 192 per-
cent from 1970 to 1994. The associated sharp
rise in out-of-wedlock births resulted princi-
pally from a decline in marriage rates, rather
than a rise in fertility rates, among all popula-
tions.✝
Children of single-parent families are gen-
erally at a disadvantage relative to children of
two-parent families in terms of opportunities
available to them early in life. For example,
single parents report being less involved in
their children’s schooling than parents who
raise their children together.44 The results are
evident early in children’s school performance:
Children of single parents are much more
likely to repeat first grade than are children
with two parents.45
In addition to the negative impact on fam-
ily life, the trend toward one-parent families
has, on average, reduced the earning capacity
of low-income families, contributing signifi-
cantly to rising income inequality. This trend
accounts for nearly half of the increase in the
incidence of poverty in the population at large
since the early 1970s. 46  More alarmingly, the
entire increase in child poverty during this
period can be attributed statistically to the
shift toward one-parent families.47 The break-
down of the two-parent family brings with it
deep social and economic problems that can-
not be fully overcome by public policies.
✝ Birthrates among unmarried women fell significantly for blacks
but rose for whites between the late 1960s and the early 1980s,
the period of most intense “reproductive technology shock.”
The marriage rate of women age 15 to 44 fell dramatically for
both groups. See George A. Akerlof and Janet L. Yellen, “An
Analysis of Out-of-Wedlock Births in the United States,” Quar-
terly Journal of Economics (May 1996), pp. 276-317.
The Shift to Single-Parent Families(a)
(a) Family Groups with children under 18 years old.
SOURCE: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Current Population Reports, P20-447.
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RECOMMENDATIONS TO
BROADEN OPPORTUNITY
Stagnant or declining real incomes and
growing inequality have raised concerns about
America’s future as the “land of opportunity.”
How can we ensure that opportunities
become or remain open to all? A critical part
of the task is to pursue the program for more
rapid economic growth outlined above. While
a less-dynamic, slowly growing economy may
preserve certain low-productivity jobs in the
short-term, over the longer term lower growth
is likely to diminish opportunities and incomes
across society.
But growth, while necessary, may no longer
be sufficient. In the past, higher growth alone
went a long way toward ensuring opportu-
nity for the vast majority of Americans. While
the United States was an agrarian and later an
industrial economy, getting ahead typically
required little more than what most Ameri-
cans were willing and able to do — show up
and put in an “honest day’s work.” Such per-
sonal attributes are still vitally necessary for
productive employment in today’s dynamic,
globally competitive economy, but they are
no longer sufficient to guarantee a middle-
class income. Education, skills, and adaptabil-
ity have become increasingly important, and
opportunity beckons for those who possess
them. But for those who lack these attributes,
more doors will continue to be closed than
open.
It is at this juncture that the compatibility
— indeed, the synergy — between growth
and opportunity become most apparent. In
our new, post-industrial economy, the acqui-
sition of human capital is becoming not only
the “door to opportunity,” but an even more
powerful engine of overall economic growth
as well. As a result, the policy recommenda-
tions for broadening economic opportunity
presented below should also be seen as
recommendations to enhance growth by
developing the economic capacities of all
Americans.
What are the pathways of opportunity that
take us from birth to adulthood and prepare
us for productive working lives? What factors
help determine who becomes a skilled, edu-
cated worker and who does not? The tradi-
tional paths of opportunity can be summa-
rized briefly:
• access to adequate nutrition, health care,
cognitive stimulation, and safe neighbor-
hoods as young children;
• access to quality schools and other learn-
ing environments as children and adolescents;
• access to post-secondary education and
skill development, based on merit and in-
terests as young adults.
Within this framework, we offer recom-
mendations to expand opportunities for indi-
viduals from early childhood into adulthood.
Efforts to expand opportunity in each of these
areas typically involve some public resources.
However, where opportunities are lacking, the
failure may be due as much or more to an
ineffective use of public resources as to the
amounts provided to address the problems
(see “Quality Versus Quantity in Expanding
Opportunity,”page 25).  Often, greater inter-
action between the public and private sectors
through public-private “partnerships” is a use-
ful means of improving program effective-
ness, leveraging public resources, and tapping
into the expertise and dynamism of the pri-
vate sector.
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Poverty, particularly during the crucial first
few years of life, greatly reduces the opportu-
nities that children encounter later in life.48
Poor children are less likely than non-poor
children to develop cognitive abilities at ap-
propriate levels by the time they reach kinder-
garten.49 Cognitive ability is affected signifi-
cantly by the quality of nutritional and health
care afforded children early in life; yet, poor
families are more than twice as likely as the
non-poor to lack any health insurance, with
the lack of coverage particularly acute among
the working poor.50 Furthermore, poor fami-
lies are three times as likely as non-poor fami-
lies to live in neighborhoods where conditions
and community services are so bad that they
would like to move51 (see “When Poverty De-
fines a Place,” page 26).
Children of poor families, particularly of
single-parent welfare families, are likely to
 RECOMMENDATION 4
OPPORTUNITIES DURING
EARLY CHILDHOOD✝
Poor children often live in environments that
produce lifetime setbacks to economic well-
being. We support policies that will help
improve these environments from birth and,
indeed, during the pre-natal period. These
include an adequate income safety net for
families that is structured to encourage work
among the parents and programs outside of
the home that prepare children — cognitively,
nutritionally, and socially — for the chal-
lenges and rewards of K-12 education and
beyond.
The amount spent on “opportunity pro-
grams,” such as those to alleviate poverty or to
train workers, may be an important measure
of society’s efforts to expand opportunity. But
expenditures do not measure results. At least
as important is the effectiveness with which
public resources are used. The experiences of
welfare and job training programs are instruc-
tive on this point.
There is a broad (and bipartisan) consensus
that welfare programs in general have not
been effective at broadening opportunity for
the disadvantaged. At best, they may do no
more than relieve abject poverty.a Welfare
often simply maintains the status quo among
poor families, offering them little chance or
incentive to break the cycle of poverty.
Whether due to a reluctance to force welfare
recipients into the labor market or a lack of
commitment to provide the resources neces-
sary to end individuals’ need for welfare, wel-
fare programs historically have done little to
help recipients help themselves. As a result,
QUALITY VERSUS QUANTITY IN EXPANDING OPPORTUNITY
the implicit incentives created by welfare pro-
grams often have been inconsistent with the
opportunity paths available to the society at
large: education, employment, and training.
The experience of public training programs
for workers is similarly discouraging.b Since
their inception in the mid-1960s, the federal
employment and training programs have been
plagued by poor design, poor administration,
and frequent policy changes. For example,
funding criteria have been too loosely defined,
so that expenditures recorded as “training”
have often been no more than wage subsidies
in public or private low-skill jobs. Such prac-
tices have contributed to an overall lack of
focus in a proliferation of 164 different training
programs. Measured results, not surprisingly,
show no effects for youth and only modest
success for adults.
(a) See: Irwin Garfinkel, “Economic Security for Children,”
in Social Policies for Children, ed. Irwin Garfinkel, Jennifer
Hochschild, and Sara McLanahan, (Washington, D.C.:
The Brookings Institution, 1996), pp. 33-82.
(b) See CED American Workers and Economic Change (1996).
✝See the following CED statements: Why Child Care Matters:
Preparing Young Children for a More Productive America (1993),
Children in Need: Investment Strategies for the Educationally Disad-
vantaged (1987), Rebuilding Inner-City Communities: A New
Approach to the Nation’s Urban Crisis (1995).
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develop higher cognitive skills in a pre-school
environment than they would by remaining
at home.52 Yet the Head Start program only
reaches 17 percent of 3-year-olds and 41 per-
cent of 4-year-olds who are eligible to partici-
pate.53 As a result, many poor children enter
kindergarten at a learning disadvantage.
It is first and foremost the responsibility of
parents to plan their families and invest in
their children. In 1990, 45 percent of first births
in the United States were to mothers who were
teenagers, unwed, or lacked a high school de-
gree. In the environment described by these
statistics, public policies cannot substitute for
a new ethic of personal and parental responsi-
bility. They can, however, provide some sup-
port for children whose parents are unable to
do so on their own. Moreover, effective public
investments in poor families and children can
provide economic returns. They can help to
move individuals off welfare and into pro-
ductive jobs. And they can help turn potential
welfare recipients into productive workers and
citizens.
THE EARNED INCOME TAX
CREDIT (EITC)
Poor families cannot invest in their
children’s futures if they are unable to sustain
themselves in the present. Individuals who
work full-time to support their families should
not want for basic needs. We believe that the
EITC represents the best approach to ensur-
ing an adequate minimum income for work-
ing families. The EITC rewards work by pro-
viding income supplements for low-wage
earners. As the wages of these workers have
fallen, the EITC has become an increasingly
important source of income for many work-
ing poor.✝ Further, under the new work-based
The lack of opportunity faced by poor chil-
dren often is made more acute by the communi-
ties in which they live. The combination of crime,
poor schools, inadequate public services (includ-
ing police, public transportation, and hospitals),
and high unemployment weighs heavily on poor
families who reside in inner cities. For inner-city
children, the barriers to opportunities for eco-
nomic betterment are often defined by geogra-
phy as much as they are by family and other
factors. Making inner cities healthy, then, is as
much an opportunity strategy for the cities’ poor
children as it is an economic development strat-
egy for the cities themselves.
Past efforts to address the social and economic
problems of inner-city neighborhoods and their
residents have often ignored the “social capital”
— the community prerequisites — necessary for
lasting success. CED believes success requires
that both public and private sectors adopt a com-
munity-building style of problem solving.a
WHEN POVERTY DEFINES A PLACE
This approach has certain distinctive charac-
teristics. Neighborhood residents must partici-
pate in efforts to identify and resolve neighbor-
hood problems. Community-based institutions,
such as community development corporations,
schools, and churches, must become front-line
service deliverers within their neighborhoods.
In addition, problem-solving efforts must be
comprehensive, rather than piecemeal and nar-
rowly focused.
To enhance community building, federal,
state, and local governments should encourage
and participate in partnerships that link inner-
city residents and their community-based
organizations to support from government,
the business community, and the philanthropic
sector.
(a) See the following CED statements: Rebuilding Inner-City
Communities: A New Approach to the Nation’s Urban Crisis,
(1995), and Connecting Inner-City Youth to the World of Work,
(1997).
✝According to the IRS, 18.3 million low-income wage earners
claimed $24.8 billion under the EITC for 1995 (up from $19.9
billion and 17.7 million filers from the previous year).
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welfare system enacted last year (see follow-
ing section), the EITC is likely to take on an
even more important “safety-net” role for un-
skilled welfare recipients who will be thrust
into the world of work at very low wages.
The EITC is also important as a matter of
equity and work incentives within the low-
income population. For both reasons, it is im-
portant that working parents receive larger
rewards than those who do not work. The
EITC makes it possible to provide other sup-
port to non-working mothers while still pre-
serving such a differential.54
In response to evidence of program abuse,
reforms have been instituted to simplify the
filing process, safeguard against fraud, and
better target eligibility to intended recipients.55
Despite these reforms, the program was tar-
geted by Congress in 1995 for cuts towards its
balanced budget goal. This effort failed,
although compliance rules were further tight-
ened as part of the overall welfare reform
legislation (see “Welfare Reform,” below). We
believe the EITC is a high-priority program
and merits continued support. At the same
time, policy makers must continue their
efforts to improve compliance by reducing
fraud, errors, and negligence.
WELFARE REFORM
The social safety net for low-income fami-
lies can greatly affect the opportunities avail-
able to young children. Therefore, public poli-
cies to assist poor families should be designed
to foster personal responsibility, motivation
for self-improvement, and work, while ensur-
ing that basic needs are met. The EITC is one
important element of the safety net. A well-
designed welfare system is another. The wel-
fare reforms enacted last year56 take a major
step away from a decades-old, open-ended
income support system to one that limits the
time individuals can receive public welfare
benefits and requires recipients to work.
Through block grants, the new system gives
states considerable new flexibility to design
their own welfare-delivery systems. We are
concerned, however, about the fact that the
federal reforms will substantially reduce fed-
eral funds to states in future years while pro-
viding weak requirements for states to main-
tain their own levels of funding for welfare
programs.✝
While the old welfare system often dis-
couraged work, more than a lack of motiva-
tion separates many welfare mothers from jobs.
For example, 63 percent of those who stay on
welfare for five years or more lack a high
school diploma. Under anticipated labor mar-
ket conditions, it is unrealistic to expect that a
large proportion of uneducated, inexperienced,
low-skill mothers will find and retain employ-
ment without substantial interim public sup-
port. In a workplace increasingly dependent
on skills, education, and the use of technol-
ogy, the private sector is unlikely to generate
enough jobs at non-poverty wages for the
approximately two-million welfare recipients,
largely unskilled, who will be thrust into the
labor market each year (after full implementa-
tion of the reforms) as a result of the new
work requirements.✝✝
Getting mothers off welfare successfully
without endangering their children will
require — in addition to motivation on the
part of the recipients — education, training,
and job placement assistance for the mothers,
as well as child and health care for the chil-
dren. An effective work-based welfare system
is likely to cost more than the old system, at
✝ Overall, the legislation is expected to reduce federal spending
by $54 billion over six years. Most of this saving results from
reductions in the Food Stamp program and aid to legal immi-
grants. States are allowed to reduce their own contributions by
amounts that total up to $40 billion over the same period.
✝✝ The Urban Institute estimates that at least 33 percent of those
dismissed from the welfare rolls after the five-year limit will be
unable to find or hold jobs (this figure is somewhat below the
40 percent estimate made by the Department of Health and
Human Services). See Sheila Zedlewski, Sandra Clark, Eric
Meier, and Keith Watson, Potential Effects of Congressional Wel-
fare Reform Legislation on Family Incomes (Washington, D.C.: The
Urban Institute, July 26, 1996).
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least in the short term. The public is under-
standably reluctant to support adults who they
believe lack appropriate work incentives and
standards of behavior. Nevertheless, the sig-
nificant long-term costs of failing to protect
and help children in need make it easy to be
“penny wise and pound foolish.”
Absent a federal “safety-net” of minimum
standards and support, poor and needy chil-
dren and adults in some states will be at par-
ticularly high risk, as their states may simply
not be up to the task administratively, finan-
cially, and politically.✝ States that make an
honest attempt to move their welfare clients
into productive employment may find the
resources for their efforts lacking.✝✝ As a
result, there is some danger that this bold
effort to transform our nation’s welfare sys-
tem into an opportunity program will fail for
lack of financial resources.
CHILD DEVELOPMENT
The likelihood that a child born in poverty
will become a poor adult is influenced greatly
by developments during the first three to five
years of life.57  That so much opportunity can
be opened or closed off in so short a time is as
unsettling as it is promising. We believe it is
essential to help poor parents invest in their
children’s futures at this early stage. CED be-
lieves that high-quality pre-natal care, child
care, and child development programs (such
as Head Start) are important public invest-
ments that can help break the cycle of pov-
erty.
Head Start children enter school better pre-
pared than they would have been without this
pre-school experience. However, we are con-
cerned that the gains made through Head Start
may not be long-lasting, particularly among
black children.58 The evidence suggests that,
in some cases, the investments made at the
pre-school level have not been adequately sus-
tained by investments during the school-age
years. The implication is clear: The schools
that Head Start children attend must improve
in order to build on the progress made dur-
ing the children’s pre-school years.
In addition to the cognitive, nutritional,
and social development that programs like
Head Start provide, young children need ac-
cess to health care. Despite our concerns about
the impact of the time limits imposed by wel-
fare reform on the well-being of poor chil-
dren, we note and support the preservation of
Medicaid benefits in the new system.
 RECOMMENDATION 5
EDUCATIONAL
OPPORTUNITIES FOR
CHILDREN AND
ADOLESCENTS✝✝✝
The nation’s public schools must better pre-
pare our youth for an economy in which
skills and knowledge increasingly determine
success. To improve performance, we must
create clear standards for educational out-
comes with more effective accountability and
incentive structures to help students, teach-
ers, and school administrators raise achieve-
ment. We should also work to obtain ad-
equate funding for less-affluent school
districts that can use resources effectively.
✝The Urban Institute estimates that the new welfare reform
legislation will raise the number of children in poverty by
nearly 11 percent (from 9.7 million to 10.8 million).
✝✝ Financing will be especially problematic for states that pro-
vided very low benefits in the past, since the distribution of
federal block-grant funding closely follows the prior pattern, in
which federal funds were matched to state funding levels.
✝✝✝See the following CED statements: Putting Learning First:
Governing and Managing the Schools for High Achievement (1994),
Connecting Inner-City Youth to the World of Work (1997), American
Workers and Economic Change (1996).
The quality of K-12 education differs sub-
stantially, on average, between high- and low-
income children, due to disparities in both
resources and their effective use.59 Non-poor
children, for example, are more likely to use a
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computer in the classroom than poor children.
The school environment also differs markedly
between poor and non-poor children; poor
children are nearly twice as likely to attend
schools that require security guards and metal
detectors.60
The cumulative effect of poor early child-
hood development, inferior schools, and dis-
tressed home life is evidenced in the achieve-
ment patterns at the high school level. A recent
study by the U.S. Department of Education
found that while half of all students from high
socioeconomic status (SES) families scored in
the highest quartile on high school achieve-
ment tests, less than a quarter of students from
middle-to-low SES families scored in the high-
est quartile, and just 6.5 percent of low-SES
students were top academic achievers.61
Although there is considerable controversy
about whether student achievement has
declined absolutely, there is a broad consen-
sus among employers that many schools no
longer prepare students adequately for today’s
more demanding workplace. The problem is
particularly acute in the schools that serve our
poorest students. We believe a focus on stan-
dards, performance incentives, and more
effectively targeted funding will move us in
the right direction.✝
STANDARDS FOR ACADEMIC
ACHIEVEMENT
The 1996 National Education Summit be-
tween business leaders and the nation’s gov-
ernors helped to focus public attention on one
of the most critical education issues — the
need to raise academic standards. Employers
nationwide require and expect a minimum
level of proficiency in core academic subjects
and especially in the most basic and necessary
skills of reading, writing, and mathematics.
As employers, therefore, we continue to sup-
port national standards for student achieve-
ment.
For now, academic standards continue to
be determined state-by-state, if at all. We do,
however, see two rays of hope. First, if some
states succeed in raising standards, healthy
competitive forces may be set in motion
between states. Second, if businesses articu-
late skill standards necessary for employment
to the schools, an effort that CED strongly
endorses, there will be increased pressure to
raise school achievement. There are, however,
realistic limits to what business can do; it can-
not perform what is fundamentally a public
responsibility.62
INCENTIVES FOR ACHIEVEMENT
We are persuaded that the educational per-
formance of many schools can be improved
by strengthening and restructuring the incen-
tives for academic achievement of students,
teachers, and school administrators.
First and foremost, students need stronger
incentives to learn. Many students now see
little relationship between school performance
and future life prospects. Because school per-
formance plays a very limited role in entry-
level hiring decisions, this lack of motivation
appears rational and is quite understandable.
Therefore, ties between secondary schools
and employers must be strengthened, and
schools and employers should work together
to make the connection. Further, our K-12
system is designed primarily to prepare youth
for college and serves non-college bound stu-
dents poorly. In this regard, schools should
place the counseling of non-college-bound
youth on a par with counseling for college-
bound students.
To improve business hiring decisions and
raise student incentives for achievement, we
urge high schools to link curricula and cre-
dentials more closely to employer skill require-
ments. Employers, in turn, should link their
hiring decisions more closely to student per-
✝We recognize that the blame for failure in our nation’s class-
rooms can hardly be laid fully on our schools. In this regard,
see: Laurence Steinberg, B. Bradford Brown, and Sanford
Dornbusch, Beyond the Classroom: Why School Reform Has Failed
and What Parents Need to Do, Simon & Schuster (1996) and
Laurence Steinberg, “Failure Outside the Classroom,” The Wall
Street Journal, July 11, 1996.
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formance and recommendations from school
personnel. To accomplish this, we should re-
move legal obstacles to the use of high school
diplomas, transcripts, and similar assessment
information in hiring. We also urge a more
explicit integration of academic and applied
learning through contextualized learning,✝ which
can enhance academic learning by increasing
student motivation.63
We recognize and applaud the dedication
of many teachers and school administrators.
But it is a simple fact that many do not have a
strong stake in improving student achieve-
ment. They are often neither accountable for
improved achievement nor rewarded for it.
Moreover, supervisory rules, contractual re-
strictions, and excessive tenure protections
unnecessarily dampen teacher initiatives.
We believe that reforms and programs
already underway in some schools can help
other schools that are “just getting by” to
excel and enable schools that are failing to
succeed. Two such programs are charter schools
and public school choice. These innovations hold
promise largely because they introduce ele-
ments of competition, flexibility, and account-
ability conducive to improved incentives with-
out abandoning our public responsibility to
educate all of America’s children.  Experiments
are currently under way in more comprehen-
sive school choice (that is, providing vouchers
to students that can be used at public and
private schools), and we note with interest the
preliminary results of evaluations of the
effects of voucher programs, especially those
directed at disadvantaged youth.64 However,
the experiences with such programs are too
limited, and the evidence too scant, to per-
suade us to endorse comprehensive school
choice at this time. As the numbers and scope
of such choice and voucher programs grow,
we will be in a better position to assess
their potential for improving educational
achievement.*
Financial rewards should be related more
closely to teacher and administrator compe-
tence and effectiveness. We support teacher
incentives such as merit pay for outstanding
performance and differential pay to relieve
shortages in academic disciplines and to
attract better qualified and motivated teach-
ers to these disciplines.
Finally, as a means of increasing account-
ability, we believe that site-based management
should be used more extensively. This pro-
vides principals and teachers, in consultation
with parents and others in the community,
with greater authority to make decisions on
instruction, personnel, curricula, and the allo-
cation of school resources. Increasing the
authority of the employees closest to the cus-
tomers has improved the performance of our
businesses, and we believe it can also work in
our public schools.
FUNDING
The principal problem facing most of our
public schools has not been a lack of adequate
resources, but, rather, their ineffective alloca-
tion and use. Per-pupil spending in public
elementary and secondary schools has
increased more than 80 percent, after infla-
tion, since 1970 and has more than tripled
since 1960,✝✝ without significant improvements
in performance.65 One respected study has
concluded, “The nation is spending more and
more to achieve results that are no better, and
perhaps worse.”66
We recognize that some public schools are
not adequately funded. However, many school
systems, including some that serve primarily
poor children, spend relatively large amounts
per student, yet show deplorable student per-
formance. Providing additional resources to
such schools with little or no consideration
✝Contextualized learning generally refers to classroom learn-
ing situations in which students apply abstract knowledge to
problems posed in real-world contexts.
✝✝These numbers are likely understated because state admin-
istration expenditures are not included in the primary data
after 1980-81.
*See memorandum by JAMES Q. RIORDAN, (page 39).
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given to improving their management is a
substantial waste of money.  We believe pub-
lic schools should have adequate funding, but
we also believe the leaders of our school sys-
tems must be held more accountable for
financial management, service delivery, and
especially for educational results.
States have the primary responsibility for
ensuring that communities with small taxing
capacities receive adequate resources for their
schools. Indeed, state and local governments
have traditionally provided well over 90 per-
cent of K-12 public school financing.67 As state
budgets become increasingly constrained, it
will become more difficult politically to meet
this funding responsibility. Adequate fund-
ing across school districts should continue to
be a priority in all states and we urge state
political leaders to be mindful of this respon-
sibility.68
dustry, enhances our economic prospects but
often outpaces changes in our institutions that
provide economic opportunity.
Our current higher education and training
systems serve a large number of Americans
extremely well, typically those with either the
financial resources or jobs that afford them
access to high-quality learning and skill de-
velopment. Higher education has been a fun-
damental force providing intergenerational
mobility in American society. More than one-
third of the children of high school graduates
surpass their parents in education by obtain-
ing an advanced degree.69 Remarkably, about
the same proportion of children of high school
dropouts go on to obtain an advanced degree.
It is essential that we preserve the access to
higher education and training that makes this
mobility possible. As advanced learning and
training become increasingly important to eco-
nomic success, lack of access will present an
even greater danger of social and economic
stratification in our society. We must ensure
that our higher education and training sys-
tems are responsive to the needs of today’s
economy and that they serve all members of
society.
POST-SECONDARY EDUCATION
Recent economic change has dramatically
increased the importance of post-secondary
education to the economic opportuni-
ties afforded young adults. In 1979, workers
with college degrees earned 35 percent more
than those with only high school diplomas.
By 1993, they earned 78 percent more.
However, the cost of higher education has
increased dramatically since 1980: Between
1980 and 1994, tuition at 4-year public univer-
sities, a type of institution heavily attended by
low-income students, rose 86 percent in infla-
tion-adjusted dollars.70 As real incomes have
stagnated or declined for many lower-income
families and the cost of college has exploded,
financial aid has not risen to fill the gap. The
real value of the maximum Pell grant (the
✝ See the following CED statements: American Workers and
Economic Change (1996), Connecting Inner-City Youth to the World
of Work (1997).
 RECOMMENDATION 6
OPPORTUNITIES FOR
YOUNG ADULTS✝
Public and private policies should facilitate
access to post-secondary education and skill-
development for all Americans who can take
advantage of them. Further, a commitment
of resources and targeted effort is needed to
provide economic opportunity to the least-
skilled and least-educated Americans, for
whom higher education or employer-pro-
vided training are rarely available options.
New technologies, new competitive forces,
and new ways of organizing economic activ-
ity are changing the nature and structure of
work in America. Economic change, like the
earlier restructuring from agriculture to in-
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primary grant program for low-income stu-
dents) has declined 27 percent over the past
15 years.71
The decline in real grant dollars has made
borrowing for college a necessity for more
students, regardless of income. However, af-
ter accounting for all forms of aid, the finan-
cial burden of higher education continues to
be much larger for low-income families than
for higher income families. As a share of fam-
ily income, the cost of attending a 4-year pub-
lic university is, on average, 3 to 4 times greater
for lower income families.72 Further, a survey
of recent college graduates suggests that the
strain of student loan payments is realized
sooner and to a greater degree by graduates
from low-income families than by their higher-
income peers.73 Broad-based proposals that
would offer tax credits for college attendance
to all students, regardless of income, are inap-
propriate and misguided in the context of
scarce public resources. Non-means-tested tax
credits would divert these scarce resources
away from those who truly lack the money to
attend college while providing a financial
windfall to those who would attend college
regardless of the credit.
Changes in college admission decisions
may also be reducing the access of low-in-
come students to education at leading institu-
tions. “Need-blind” admission — a principle
of admission of many colleges and universi-
ties that ignores ability to pay in considering
applicants for admission — shows signs of
deterioration, particularly among the more
expensive institutions, as administrators are
forced to rely increasingly on tuition as a rev-
enue source.74
As a result of these trends, at a time when
the marketplace has sharply raised returns for
a college education, the differential between
college enrollment rates of low income and
minority youth and those of higher income
white youth has increased.75 Although low-
income youth in general are enrolling at his-
torically high rates, they remain well behind
higher-income youth in college enrollment.76
We believe that adequate public resources
should be made available to ensure that quali-
fied and motivated students of limited means
can pursue higher education. At the same time,
just as K-12 schools must be held to a high
standard of efficiency in the use of public
funds, so must programs to fund higher edu-
cation and the higher education institutions
themselves. Programs such as the Pell grant
and guaranteed student loans meet an urgent
need and funding policies should ensure that
they are not abused by fly-by-night “diploma
mills” that exist solely to exploit public funds.
In addition, legitimate higher education insti-
tutions should more aggressively pursue in-
novations to increase productivity and reduce
escalating costs so that they are better able to
serve all prospective students.
TRAINING FOR SKILL DEVELOPMENT
To successfully negotiate the twists and
turns of a dynamic economy, workers must
engage in continuous learning and skill
development. Traditional job security is becom-
ing less common in today’s economy, and
workers must become more dependent on the
employment security provided by their skills
and adaptability. While our K-12 education
system is the primary foundation for skill
development, community colleges, employer-
based training, and public training programs
can also be important sources of skill develop-
ment.
Community colleges have emerged as an
innovative and important source of skill
development. Through extensive business
input, these schools are able to train students
using the latest technology and are able to do
so according to employer-certified standards
of excellence. The advantage of education and
training received at community colleges is
reflected in earnings: male community college
graduates earn 17 percent more and female
graduates earn 28 percent more than male
and female high school graduates.77
Formal, on-the-job training appears to raise
firm productivity significantly (by roughly 15
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to 20 percent) with associated gains in worker
wages.78 However, in our new, more competi-
tive economy, proportionately fewer workers
are in large, established firms with strong train-
ing traditions. Although on-the-job training is
increasing, business as a whole may be
underinvesting in training. Because of the in-
creasing importance of supplier networks,
we particularly urge larger firms to assist
their smaller suppliers with employee train-
ing. CED also recommends that educational
and other training institutions expand train-
ing assistance to smaller firms (e.g., through
private-public consortia).
Public training programs offer another po-
tential source of skill development. However,
although CED supports the goals of federal
employment and training policies, we cannot
support programs as currently designed and
administered. For the most part, these pro-
grams are uncoordinated, duplicative, and
with a few exceptions, ineffective. In 1995-96,
despite a promising start, Congress and the
President were unable to reach a compromise
on work force development legislation that
would reform and consolidate federal job train-
ing programs.✝ Streamlining our public train-
ing arrangements should be an item of the
highest priority for the 105th Congress.
CED has made several recommendations
with respect to these programs. Accountabil-
ity for program results should be strength-
ened and ineffective programs eliminated.
Federal training programs should be con-
solidated into a single program structure
under the oversight of one agency. Training
assistance should not be a thinly veiled wage
subsidy; it should be restricted to counsel-
ing, job search, and formal training. Service
delivery should be administered by state and
local authorities. Finally, programs should
link training to real jobs through private
employer involvement wherever possible.
For the least skilled and least educated,
job-based training is precluded by the inabil-
ity or failure to get a job.✝✝ Nor are these indi-
viduals served by the many public training
programs targeted at dislocated workers.
Locked in a vicious cycle of unemployment
(or underemployment), little education, and
no skills, these individuals fall quickly into
public assistance with little hope for economic
progress.
Opportunity for these Americans depends
critically on efforts to motivate them and ready
them for the workplace. Programs that extend
a combination of job-placement assistance,
education, and skill-development to the least-
skilled and least-educated (often high school
dropouts or the products of bad schools) pro-
vide some hope for a viable future. History
demonstrates that expectations for success in
these efforts should be modest. The experi-
ence of welfare-to-work programs, in particu-
lar, suggest that their greatest success is in
creating a first step for their clients: getting
them into the work force through work
requirements and intensive job-placement
assistance. In Riverdale and San Diego, Cali-
fornia, public investments in such programs
have created positive returns by reducing over-
all welfare payments over time.79
✝ Congressional Democrats and the President insisted
on a $1.3 billion program for dislocated workers and
objected to the Republican proposal to repeal the School
to Work Opportunities Act.
✝✝ CED does not believe that employers have a social
responsibility to hire unqualified applicants. However,
it is legally and morally incumbent on employers to
eradicate the influence of stereotypes and discrimina-
tion in hiring practices.
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Since its founding, the United States has
been a land of opportunity. But developments
of the past 20 years suggest that the pathways
of opportunity have become harder to travel
for some. A dichotomy has emerged between
the dynamism and flexibility of our overall
economy and the limited economic opportu-
nities available to some members of our soci-
ety. In particular, there is a danger that
human capital investments, which historically
have increased mobility and opportunity, will
begin to widen economic disparities if they
are not broadly shared in our increasingly
skills-based society.
CED is convinced that appropriate policies
can enhance both growth and opportunity.
We also believe that policies focused on one of
these objectives to the exclusion of the other
will ultimately fail, if not economically, then
socially and politically. Good growth policies
and good opportunity policies are mutually
reinforcing. As a result, the policy agenda we
lay out in this statement is greater than the
sum of its parts. CED urges policy makers to
keep this in mind as they consider these rec-
ommendations.
While we (and others) can provide analy-
sis and recommendations, only our elected
policy makers can provide the political lead-
ership to reject narrow interests and superfi-
cially attractive ideology and implement poli-
cies that will both enhance economic growth
and foster broader opportunity.
CONCLUSION
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MEMORANDA OF COMMENT, RESERVATION, OR DISSENT
Page 2, JAMES Q. RIORDAN
We rightly call for policies that will not
only encourage but also eliminate impedi-
ments to economic growth and economic
opportunity. I am sure that over any reason-
able time frame our growth and opportunity
goals will not conflict. The GI Bill proved this.
Page 10, JAMES Q. RIORDAN
We are right to state once again that in-
creased national savings are very much
needed. It is clear that we would benefit from
less government dissaving. It is not true, how-
ever, in my opinion, that “the most certain
and effective policy to increase national sav-
ing is to eliminate the government dissaving
resulting from federal budget deficits.” Elimi-
nation of federal deficits is anything but cer-
tain and our constant calls for political cour-
age to eliminate the deficits have not yet been
effective. The national debt has increased ev-
ery year we have published a statement call-
ing attention to the dangers of increased debt.
(Furthermore if we properly accounted for
unfunded federal promises we would better
understand that our true debt and deficit prob-
lem is greater than that politically acknowl-
edged.) I have come to believe that national
saving will significantly increase only if pri-
vate savings significantly increase. Policies that
rely on enlightened self-interest are more likely
to work than appeals for political courage.
Desirable as reduced deficits would be, our
first priorities should be to educate the private
sector on the need to increase savings; revamp
unfunded federal promises (e.g. Social Secu-
rity) that encourage people to save less; and
reform the tax laws that treat more harshly
those who save than those who consume. Pri-
vate savings don’t need incentives so much as
they need the elimination of double taxation
disincentives. Since we tax the income from
savings, we should not tax income that is
saved.
Page 11, EDMUND B. FITZGERALD
This statement is self serving and does not
add to the spirit of the CED policy statement.
Page 18, JAMES Q. RIORDAN
The discussion of income disparity in my
view is not helpful or relevant to the state-
ment or its recommendations. The disparity
data are yet not fully understood, explained,
or explored. For example, the numbers are
sensitive to the relative earnings growth of the
top sliver of super incomes of certain invest-
ment bankers; entertainers; athletes; Chief
Executive Officers, etc. Furthermore seeming
trends in disparities are sensitive to regional
39
economic cycles. Disparities appear to go down
when the midcontinent (with a relatively low
cost of living) booms and to increase when
California and New York (with relatively high
costs of living) boom.
In my view, the need for policies that fos-
ter widespread economic growth and oppor-
tunity is pressing without regard to trends in
the relative compensation of the top 100,000
stars of Hollywood and Wall Street. I am con-
cerned that the disparity discussion is more
likely to provoke class warfare debate than to
achieve a consensus on either disparity or on
the need to eliminate disincentives to save
and the need to invest in training, education,
and new and better ways to address the prob-
lems of disadvantaged children.
Page 30, JAMES Q. RIORDAN
We need to do everything we can to meet
the challenge of children living in poverty with
single parents in dangerous neighborhoods
with failings schools. I think that there is a
reasonable chance that increased choice is one
of the steps that will help to correct the failing
school problem. I hope that CED will soon
come to endorse school choice for disadvan-
taged children, even if it is not ready to en-
dorse it for all children.
For more than 50 years, the Committee for
Economic Development has been a respected
influence on the formation of business and
public policy. CED is devoted to these two
objectives:
To develop, through objective research and
informed discussion, findings and recommenda-
tions for private and public policy that will con-
tribute to preserving and strengthening our free
society, achieving steady economic growth at high
employment and reasonably stable prices, increas-
ing productivity and living standards, providing
greater and more equal opportunity for every
citizen, and improving the quality of life for all.
To bring about increasing understanding by
present and future leaders in business, govern-
ment, and education, and among concerned
citizens, of the importance of these objectives and
the ways in which they can be achieved.
CED’s work is supported by private volun-
tary contributions from business and
industry, foundations, and individuals. It is
independent, nonprofit, nonpartisan, and non-
political.
Through this business-academic partner-
ship, CED endeavors to develop policy state-
ments and other research materials that
commend themselves as guides to public and
business policy; that can be used as texts in
college economics and political science courses
and in management training courses; that
will be considered and discussed by news-
paper and magazine editors, columnists, and
commentators; and that are distributed abroad
to promote better understanding of the Ameri-
can economic system.
CED believes that by enabling business
leaders to demonstrate constructively their
concern for the general welfare, it is helping
business to earn and maintain the national
and community respect essential to the
successful functioning of the free enterprise
capitalist system.
OBJECTIVES OF THE COMMITTEE FOR
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
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*Statements issued in association with CED counterpart organizations in foreign countries.
*
*
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CEDA Committee for Economic Development of Australia
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Helsinki, Finland
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CED COUNTERPART ORGANIZATIONS
Close relations exist between the Committee for Economic Development and
independent, nonpolitical research organizations in other countries. Such counter-
part groups are composed of business executives and scholars and have objec-
tives similar to those of CED, which they pursue by similarly objective methods.
CED cooperates with these organizations on research and study projects of
common interest to the various countries concerned. This program has resulted
in a number of joint policy statements involving such international matters as
energy, East-West trade, assistance to developing countries, and the reduction
of nontariff barriers to trade.
